Open — responses due 23 Nov 2026 (9 days left) · No Set aside used · Department of the Air Force, DoD · Kirtland AFB, NM · NAICS 541715 · Solicitation MultiSourcePNT_RFI_01
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Description
Amendment 2: The purpose of this amendment is to change the response date from 16 November 2026 to 23 November 2026. Amendment 1: The purpose of this amendment is to change the response date from 16 November 2027 to 16 November 2026. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION MULTI-SOURCE PNT UE 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION This Request for Information (RFI) is issued solely for information and planning purposes (market research). This RFI does not constitute a solicitation (Request for Proposal (RFP) or Request for Quotations (RFQ)) or a promise to issue a solicitation in the future. This RFI does not commit the Government to contract for any supply or service whatsoever. Furthermore, the Government is not, at this time, seeking proposals and will not accept any unsolicited proposals. Respondents are advised the Government will not pay for any information or administrative costs incurred in response to this RFI. All costs associated with responding to this RFI will be solely at the responding party’s expense. Not responding to this RFI does not preclude participation in any future RFP, if any is issued. Any information submitted by respondents to this RFI is strictly voluntary. All submissions become Government property and will not be returned. Due to the operational sensitivity of the Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) missions, any future acquisition resulting from this market research will require strict adherence to Department of War (DoW) and Department of Defense (DoD) security, cybersecurity, and supply chain integrity standards. Consequently, while direct responses to this RFI must remain entirely unclassified (reach out to the government contacts below for information on classified submissions), respondents are required to demonstrate their organizational posture regarding facility clearances, information safeguarding, and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) supply chain compliance. For the purposes of this market research, the anticipated North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for manufacturing global positioning systems (GPS) and related equipment is 334220 (Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing) with a Small Business Size Standard of $44.0 Million, and the primary Product Service Code (PSC) for Global Positioning Systems (GPS) hardware is 5825 (Radio Navigation Equipment, Except Airborne). For specialized, airborne GPS or radar navigation, the code is typically 5826. System-level R&D and engineering services for GPS are usually categorized under codes like R425 (Engineering Services) or AC13 (R&D—Defense System: Electronics). 2.0 BACKGROUND With advances in autonomous systems and guided munitions, the force that can best synchronize its activities at a single point in time and space wields a potent strategic advantage. In the future operating environment, therefore, the Joint Force will increasingly depend on resilient, reliable, and precise position, navigation, and timing (PNT) data to execute combat operations. As such, the Space Force is required to deliver global continuous coverage with stringent civil and military position and timing requirements to assure safety and mission success. This includes at least 88% of the constellation being operationally available more than 98% of the time. Likewise, a thinking adversary will make focused and deliberate efforts to deny access to this capability, leveraging a growing suite of threats including electromagnetic weapons, cyberspace attacks, and kinetic weapons. The challenge today is that, while satellite navigation (SATNAV) through the Global Positioning System (GPS) is foundational to U.S. military operations, critical infrastructure, and global commerce, the current architecture must adapt to evolving jamming and spoofing threats. Additionally, the space and ground segments must be modernized and hardened against physical attack. To build readiness for the future operating environment, therefore, the Space Force will pursue a comprehensive navigation warfare (NAVWAR) strategy that emphasizes resilience, technology modernization, modularity, adaptability, and flexibility. Specifically, it will adopt an open hybrid approach to SATNAV architecture that weighs inputs from diverse sources according to user need, generating a more dependable capability that can withstand adversary action while enabling faster upgrade cycles to enable PNT capabilities. The NAVWAR Objective Force pursues the development and deployment of several key capabilities to advance the SATNAV architecture. One of those elements is User Segment. To make best use of diversified PNT sources, the Space Force will enable a transition to a Multi-Source PNT user equipment (UE) reference architecture that incorporates Modular Open System Architectures (MOSA) and an onboard fusion engine to integrate all available data at the user level. The key enabler of the NAVWAR Objective Force is continued Joint Force investment in Multi-Source PNT UE that utilizes both traditional and new PNT sources. This equipment is foundational to a user’s ability to devise and execute a NAVWAR PACE (i.e., Primary / Alternate / Contingency / Emergency) Plan in degraded or denied environments. While legacy signals are expected to remain supported for civil and public functions, they are increasingly less effective in the contested environment. The military-specific M-Code is available today, while the PNT modernization signals are projected to be available by 2035. 3.0 OBJECTIVE, DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS This Request for Information (RFI) is focused on obtaining access to analytical information on industrial capabilities in Multi-Source PNT UE the NAVWAR Objective Force. Interests include the following: Multi-Source PNT UE for Terrestrial Users on various military platforms Disadvantaged user High value military assets MOSA Signals supported (M-code, CA, commercial), etc Space Service Volume Multi-Source PNT UE (various orbits) Small satellite users Large satellite users MOSA Signals supported (M-code, CA, commercial), etc Interest is in technical details that can be incorporated into technical analysis to support Space Warfighting Analysis Center, Technology and Emerging Concept Assessments performed during Force Designs. This RFI is being executed in cooperation with the Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC). 4.0 SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY AND SUPPLY CHAIN REQUIREMENTS The secure nature of this requirement dictates adherence to stringent Department of War (DoW) / Department of Defense (DoD) security protocols. While direct responses to this RFI must remain unclassified, respondents shall address their current capabilities and compliance regarding the following security domains: a. Facility and Personnel Security Clearances Given the operational nature of Multi-Source PNT UE and the potential for integration with multiple military architectures, e?orts will likely require access to classified information and systems. Respondents must state their current Facility Clearance Level (FCL) (e.g., None, Secret, Top Secret) and classified safeguarding capabilities. Respondents should confirm their capacity to provide appropriately cleared personnel (Personnel Security Clearances - PCL) and facility infrastructure to support secure development, testing, and operations. Please indicate your facility's current capability and experience in handling, storing, and integrating Communications Security (COMSEC) and Transmission Security (TRANSEC) materials. b. Cybersecurity and Information Safeguarding (CUI/CDI) The protection of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Covered Defense Information (CDI) is critical to this effort. In accordance with DFARS 252.204-7012, 7019, and 7020, respondents must describe their current capability to safeguard CUI/CDI. Please indicate your current compliance status with NIST SP 800-171, confirm whether an active assessment score exists within the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS), and state your current readiness posture for the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) (Level 2 or higher). c. Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) & NDAA Compliance Due to the critical nature of space capabilities and the associated user segment architecture, rigorous supply chain integrity must be maintained. Respondents must confirm their current compliance with Section 889 of the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (FAR 52.204-24 and 52.204-25), which prohibits the procurement or use of covered telecommunications equipment or services from prohibited Chinese entities. Briefly describe your corporate Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) approach to identifying and mitigating risks (e.g., counterfeit parts, malicious hardware/software insertion) across both the space vehicle payload and any proposed commercial ground infrastructure. 5.0 INFORMATION REQUESTED Responses shall provide clear descriptions of the existing or proposed…
Version history
SAM.gov has posted 3 notices under solicitation MultiSourcePNT_RFI_01, oldest first.
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